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INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 2002, a U.S. armored vehicle ran over two thirteenyear-old Korean girls near the Twin Bridges training area, about
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fifteen miles north of Seoul, South Korea.' Both victims died on the
spot.2 According to the Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA")
between the Republic of Korea ("South Korea") and the United
States,' which sets out the two countries' respective jurisdiction over
offenses U.S. service members commit in South Korea, the right to
try the two U.S. soldiers manning the armored vehicle belonged to
U.S. military authorities. South Korea's Ministry of Justice requested
waiver of such right, which the U.S. authorities rejected.' A U.S.
court martial found both of the accused not guilty of negligent
homicide in November 2002.1
Although the United States awarded compensation to the victims'
families, and U.S. President George W. Bush, the Commander in
Chief of U.S. forces in Korea, and the two soldiers involved offered

* Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Law School; Attorney, Steptoe & Johnson;
Visiting Professorial Fellow, Institute for International Economic Law: Member of
Korean & New York Bar Associations: LLM, JSD, Yale Law School.
** Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of
Korea; LL.B., Seoul National University. Opinions and conclusions in this paper
are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Korean government.
1. Jeremy Kirk, Year in Review: A Look Back at the Top Pacific Storiesfrom
2002: Turmoil in S. Korea, STARS AND STRIPES, Jan. 2, 2003 (reporting that the
girls, Shim Mi-sun and Shin Hyo-soon, were killed near a military training area
while
walking
to
a
birthday
party),
available
at
http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section= 104&article= 11868&archive=true
(last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
2. See id. (explaining that the U.S. soldiers could neither hear nor see the two
young girls before they struck them).
3. Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and
Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea,
July 9, 1966, U.S.-S. Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677 [hereinafter Korea SOFA].
4. See Jae-Hyeok Choi, USFK Jurisdiction Waiver Requestedfor First Time,
CHOSUN ILBO, July 10, 2002 (Eng. ed.) (reporting that the United States was
unlikely to grant the request because the two men were on duty at the time of the
accident and had already been charged with vehicular manslaughter), available at
http://english.chosun.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2003). This is the first time Korea
has requested such waiver. Id.
5. See Controversy Continues Over U.S. Court Martial Verdict, KOREA
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002 (on file with the author).
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public apologies,6 the Korean populace did not receive the verdict
well. A large crowd gathered in candlelight vigils, partly to condemn
the acquittal of the U.S. soldiers.7 Some Korean activists questioned
the verdict and called for the soldiers to be tried under the Korean
legal system.8 A large number of people developed the perception
that an element of unfairness in the SOFA was largely responsible
for what they thought was an unfair verdict.
"Revision of SOFA" has become one of the most popular slogans
in the demonstrations. Crimes by U.S. service members and, by
extension, the Korea SOFA have increasingly become a
controversial issue in Korea, and the accident that killed the two girls
served as a catalyst for the recent explosion of such popular
demands. Many critics have regarded the SOFA as an expression of
the unequal relationship between Korea and the United States. 9 To
6. See Kirk, supra note 1 (stating that that President Bush, several four-star
generals, and the two sergeants who were charged with the girls' deaths released
public apologies following the incident).
7. See Woo-San Jeong, Candle Lit Rally Commemorates Schoolgirls, CHOSUN
ILBO, Dec.15, 2002 (Eng. ed.) (reporting that 56,000 people nationwide attended
candlelight demonstrations to commemorate the two school girls), available at
http://english.chosun.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2003). In Seoul, 40,000 people
gathered to support the "People's Movement for the Amendment of the SOFA." Id.
8. See T.D. Flack & Choe Song-won, S. Koreans Hold Pro-USFKRally Near
Osan Base, STARS AND STRIPES, Jan. 10, 2003 (describing a pro-American military
rally as "an oddity," because in the previous month thousands of protesters
demanded that U.S. troops withdraw and that the Korean government revise its
legal
guidelines
governing
service
members),
available
at
http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section = I04&article = 11 935&archive-true
(last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
9. See Jae-Ho Sung, CriminalJurisdictionof the SOFA Between the Republic
of Korea and the United States, 5 SEOUL INT'L L. J. (1988) (discussing various
aspects of the Korea SOFA with focus on criminal jurisdiction); Chu-Young
Chang, Civil Claims Clause: Problems and Proposalsfor Revision, in Special
Issue: Review of the Status of Forces Agreement Between the Republic of Korea
and the United States, 5 SEOUL INT'L L.J. (1988) (arguing that the Korea SOFA
has elements of unfairness and inefficiency); see also JANG-HIE LEE ET AL., A
STUDY ON THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2000) (explaining the history and

legal implication of the Korea SOFA); Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn Bowen Francis,
Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practicein East
Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 256 (2000) (stating that even in cases

where there is concurrent jurisdiction between the United States and the host
country, there is an " inequality of bargaining power"). Therefore, "individual case
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their eyes, the acquittal of the two U.S. soldiers is just another
example that clearly shows the need to revise the agreement.
In fact, the United States has concluded a great number of SOFAs,
approximately eighty to date, with many different states, ° such as
the NATO states, Japan, and South Korea.II The United States has
been deploying its armed forces in foreign territories for various
reasons, and the typical method to define the legal status of U.S.
forces stationed abroad is to enter into a SOFA with the receiving
state.' 2 Although the SOFAs that the United States has concluded
with other states seem to be framed in a similar way, the receiving
states have different reasons for allowing U.S. forces to stay in their
territories. European NATO states, Japan, and Korea have different
historical and political contexts for receiving U.S. forces. It is safe to
say that such differences in historical backgrounds and political ties
affect the debates surrounding the construction and application of
legal instruments such as SOFAs. It is quite natural that the legal
regime should evolve towards a system that keeps abreast of
changing political situations because every legal regime is embedded
in political contexts. A strict legal formalism should carry less
weight in all aspects of SOFAs, including its promulgation and
application. It is time to take a hard look at the practical and political
dynamics of SOFAs. Therefore, in order to analyze the Korea SOFA
in a proper perspective, it is necessary to understand the history and

negotiation does not ensure that local interest will be met" and "it is more likely
that the reverse will occur." Id.
10. See Colonel Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing
of Sovereign Prerogative,37 A.F. L. REV. 137, 143-44 (1994) (providing a full list
of the countries that have a formal SOFA with the United States).
11. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3 (establishing procedures governing armed
forces abroad); Status of Forces Agreement, with Appendix, between the United
States of America and Other Governments, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1972, T.I.A.S.
No. 2846 [hereinafter NATO SOFA] (joining all parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty together in a status of forces agreement with the United States);
Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty, Feb. 28, 1952,
U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3341 [hereinafter Japan SOFA] (expanding on the Security
Treaty signed between the two nations in 1951).
12. See Erickson, supra note 10, at 140-41 (noting that SOFAs define that
status of U.S. forces in "friendly states" stationed during peacetime, they do not
authorize the use or presence of those forces).
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characteristics of the political relationship between Korea and the
United States.
This paper examines the Korea SOFA, which currently has caused
more controversies than any other such agreements. It begins by
delving into the creation of the Korea SOFA in light of Korea's
modem history, and then deals with controversies over its provisions
on criminal jurisdiction and process. In conclusion, it will suggest
that the Korea SOFA is, in general, more impartial than critics argue
and that real problems with the Korea SOFA lie in its actual
application, rather than the agreement's content.

I. THE MAKING OF THE SOFA BETWEEN KOREA
AND THE UNITED STATES
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the early 1900s, Japan annexed Korea by force, and when the
United States defeated Japan in 1945, the Alliances discussed the
13
liberation of Korea.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States and
the Soviet Union assumed control over Korea's southern and
northern parts, respectively. 4 The 38th Parallel that severed the
Korean peninsula symbolized the beginning of the Cold War
between two conflicting ideological camps-democracy and
communism.
In the southern part of Korea, the "Republic of Korea" was
established with the support of the United Nations ("UN") in 1948.11
The new Korean government concluded an interim agreement with

13. See 52 NAT'L HISTORY COMPILATION COMM., HISTORY OF KOREA: THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 15-43 (2002) (explaining the
historical background of the liberation of Korea from Japan).
14. See Howard S. Levie, How It All Started and How It Ended: A Legal Study
of the Korean War, 35 AKRON L. REV. 205, 206-10 (2002) (providing a historical
account of the division of Korea).
15. See NAT'L HISTORY COMPILATION COMM., supra note 13, at 387-423
(describing how United Nations supported the establishment of the Korean
government and how the communists in the North objected to U.N.'s
involvement).
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U.S. forces, which conferred exclusive criminal jurisdiction upon the
latter over all offenses committed by its members. The agreement,
however, was terminated soon after U.S. forces returned home in
1949.10

North of the 38th Parallel, Kim Il-sung set up a communist
government with the help of the Soviet Union. 7 Kim Il-sung and.his
friends in Moscow had "taken at face value" the pronouncements of
U.S. officials that had placed Korea outside the American defense
line.' 8 Kim II-sung persuaded the Soviet leaders to back up his plan
to take over the whole peninsula, and on June 25, 1950, North
Korean tanks crossed the 38th parallel, beginning the Korean War.' 9
To the disappointment of North Korea and the Soviet Union,
however, the United States and other states promptly sent their forces
to protect the South. 20 The Soviet Union's absence from the UN

Security Council Meeting at that time made the 'swift international
action against North Korea's aggression possible. 2' The United States
and its allies allocated a great deal of military resources to win the
war, because they saw the Korean peninsula as a critical front in the
22
fight against communism.

16. See DAE-SUN KIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 367-68 (7th ed. 2002) (explaining
the history of stationing of U.S. forces in Korea).
17. See Levie, supra note 14, at 209 (providing that a Russian-trained
communist leader, Kim ll-sung, ruled North Korea for nearly fifty years until his
death in 1994).
18. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 475-76 (1994) (quoting General
Douglas MacArthur as saying "our line of defense runs through the chain of
islands fringing the coast of Asia"). Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, also made
pronouncements to the same effect. Id.
19. See Levie, supra note 14, at 210-15 (detailing the initiation of the North
Korea's attack on South Korea).
20. See KISSINGER, supra note 18, at 477 (explaining the United States'
intervention in the Korean conflict).
21. See Maury D. Shenk, The United Nations Security Council Consultation
Act: A Proposalfor MultilateralResolution of International Conflict, 28 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 247, 256-57 (1991) (explaining that the Soviet Union refused to
participate in the Security Council activities because of the dispute over Chinese
representation in the Council).
22. See KISSINGER, supra note 18, at 476 (arguing that the United States'
concern about the global spread of communism significantly effected its decision
to send troops to Korea).
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During the war, South Korea and the U.S. concluded an agreement
on the status of U.S. forces. Given the circumstances, the agreement
was the product of the Korean government's accommodation of most
23
of the requests by the United States.
The Korean War ended with the Armistice Agreement, signed at
Panmunjom, about thirty miles north of Seoul, on July 27, 1953.24
South Korea and the United States entered into the Mutual Defense
Treaty in the same year, which signaled the beginning of permanent
stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. 25 According to Article IV of the
treaty, South Korea "grants, and the United States accepts, the right
to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the
territory" of South Korea, 26 but not vice versa. 27 The term "mutual"
in the Mutual Defense Treaty did not carry much weight because the
essence of the treaty was the United States' commitment to the
defense of South Korea against its Northern enemy.28
The present Korea SOFA was concluded in accordance with the
Mutual Defense Treaty in 1966, more than a decade after the end of
the war. 29 Although the war was over, South Korea was still afraid of
a repeat attack by the North, and it desperately needed outside help,
especially from the United States, for economic development and

23. See JANG-HIE LEE ET AL., supra note 9, at 21; DAE-SUN KIM, supra note
16, at 367-68 (stating that this agreement was based on the absolute immunity of
U.S. forces from Korean jurisdiction).
24. See Levie, supra note 14, at 223-24 (reporting that negotiations for an
armistice began on July 10, 1951, but the armistice discussions were adjourned in
May, 1952). In the meantime, Stalin died on March 5, 1953, and the Soviet leaders
became more occupied with internal politics than with the war in Korea. Id. at 224.
This led to the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement. Id.
25. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and
Republic of Korea , Oct. 1, 1953, U.S.-S. Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368. [hereinafter
Mutual Defense Treaty]
26. Id. art. IV.
27. Id.
28. See KISSINGER, supra note 18, at 476 (explaining the reasoning behind the
United States' military presence in South Korea).
29. DAE-SuN KiM, supra note 16, at 368 (explaining how South Korea and the
United States agreed on the conclusion of the Korea SOFA).
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military security.30 The presence of U.S. forces in Korea was
perceived as an essential element for South Korea's security. 3
Since the 1960s, South Korea has undergone political and
economic change. Initial rapid growth of the economy was achieved
at the expense of democracy and human rights under successive
military regimes.32 In the mid 1980s, however, pro-democracy
movements, driven mainly by students, forced the government to
agree to democratic reforms and more civil freedom.33 After the
election of Kim Young-sam as President in 1993, the military was
completely cut off from political power, 14 and civil democracy
finally prevailed in South Korea.
Such developments in the South, however, had little effect on the
alleviation of the inter-Korean tension. Although representatives of
the two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between South and
North Korea in December 1991,31 the nuclear crisis of 1994, which
was ignited by the North's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty ("NPT") and International Atomic Energy Agency

30. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 9, at 231-33 (stating that the United States
stationed troops in Korea in hopes of stabilizing the area).
31.

HAK-JOON KIM, THE KOREAN WAR: CAUSES, EFFECTS, DEVELOPMENTS,

AND ARMISTICE 359-60 (1997) (stating that Korean people strongly approved the
presence of U.S. forces, based on results of opinion polls conducted in the 1950's
and 60's).
32. KYONG-SOOK CHOI, UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN HISTORY OF KOREA

322-25 (2001) (explaining that the military regimes pursued economic
development by low labor costs and state-controlled financial system).
33. See Kuk Cho, Tension Between the National Security Law and
Constitutionalism in South Korea: Securityfor What?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125, 135
(1997) (analyzing the role of pro-democracy movements in the development of
South Korea's civil reform).
34. See id. at 136 (noting that in his early days in office, President Kim YoungSam took total civilian control of the military, and dismantled an organization of
politics-oriented military officers inside the army).
35.

See SEONG-HO, THE THEORY OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH

AND NORTH (1995) (stating that this Basic Agreement provides for, among others,
recognition of each other's political system, non-interference in the internal affairs
of each other, non-use of force against each other, peaceful resolution of disputes,
and promotion of exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as economy,
science and technology).
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("IAEA"),36 showed that there was still a Cold War in the Korean
peninsula. The conclusion of Agreed Framework between the United
States and North Korea resolved the conflict,37 but the communist
regime of North Korea still remains a threat to South Korea and its
principal ally, the United States.
President Kim Dae-jung, after his inauguration in 1998, pursued
the policy of reconciliation and cooperation toward North Korea,
which was more widely known as the "Sunshine policy." Its purpose
was to help the North reconstruct its devastated economy and to
establish political reconciliation between the two Koreas.38 It resulted
in the historic summit talk between the two Koreas in 2000.
However, North Korea recently caused another conflict with the
IAEA, raising international concerns over the security and peace in
East Asia.39
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. forces in Korea
have contributed to the national security of South Korea and have
played a vital role in its economic development. The respect and
affection of Koreans for America has been high, 40 but the Korean

36. See David Sloss, It's Not Broken, So Don't Fix It: The InternationalAtomic
Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 841, 865-70 (1995) (noting that North Korea had refused to comply
with its safeguards obligations under the NPT, and this raised concerns that North
Korea was seeking the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons).
37. See id. at 870-73 (stating that the Agreed Framework provided for
measures to bring North Korea into full compliance with its NPT obligations, such
as "freezing" its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities that could be
used to produce materials of nuclear weapons). In return, the United States agreed
to organize an "international consortium to finance and supply" light-water reactor
power plants. Id.
38. See Sung Chul Yang, South Korea's Sunshine Policy: Progress and
Predicaments, 25-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 31-33 (2001) (explaining
the goals of South Korea's Sunshine Policy).
39. See Dennis Florig, The Nuclear Impasse on the Korean Peninsula: The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 11.2 INT'L J. OF KOREAN
UNIFICATION STUDIES 1, 3-4 (2002) (alleging that North Korea has developed
nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT and the Agreed Framework).
40. See Young-Tae Yim, 50 Years of the Republic of Korea, in THE OCTOBER
REVITALIZING REFORMS TILL THE GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE 163 (1998)
(describing how during the Kwang-ju Massacre, staged by the Korean military
commanders in May 1980, the citizens of Kwang-ju believed that the U.S. military
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public has become more aware of, and disappointed by, the serious
crimes U.S. service members have committed in South Korea, and
the unsatisfactory measures the Korean government has taken in line
with SOFA to address such crimes." South Korea and the United
States revised the Korea SOFA in 1991 for the first time. 2 The
United States and South Korea agreed to the second revision in 2001.
By revising the SOFA twice, the Korean government was relieved of
43
a little bit of public pressure to improve the Korea SOFA
This brief sketch of Korea's modem history explains why the
Korea SOFA has generally been framed to favor the U.S. forces,
namely because Korea has depended on America for its very
survival. For this reason, the United States has had a fundamental
advantage in terms of bargaining power in the making and revision
of the SOFA. In addition, American distrust of the Korean justice
system, which the military dictatorship had controlled, may have
encouraged U.S. forces to extend jurisdictional power as much as
possible within the SOFA system.
B. MAJOR AMENDMENTS CONCERNING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION:

1991 AND 2001
The "law of the flag," which was the basis for the agreement
concluded during the Korean War between South Korea and the
United States, gave foreign forces absolute immunity from territorial
jurisdiction.44 This agreement governed the status of U.S. service
vessels appeared to be near the west coast to help them resist the South Korean
army).
41. See James Brooke, First of 2 GI. 's on Trial in Deaths of 2 Korean Girls Is
Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, at A9 (describing how South Korean activists protested a
U.S. military court's acquittal of Sgt. Fernando Nino for hitting and killing two
Korean girls with an Army vehicle). A group of activists pledged to continue
demonstrating "until justice is done." Id.
42. See DAE-SUN KIM, supra note 16, at 369 (explaining the backgrounds of
negotiations between two countries to revise the Korea SOFA).
43. See Young-won Kim, The Past and the Present of the SOFA, in THE
ORDER OF INT'L LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THEORIES AND PRACTICES IN THE
EYES OF DIPLOMATS 124-25 (Yoon-Kyong Oh et al. ed., Pakyoungsa, Seoul, 2001)
(explaining the historical change of the Korea SOFA).
44. See id. at 110 (defining the law of the flag as a principle by which military
forces are not subject to the host nation's jurisdiction); see also Adam B. Norman,
The Rape Controversy.-Is A Revision of the Status of ForcesAgreement with Japan
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members in South Korea even after the Mutual Defense Treaty was
concluded at the end of the war in 1953. 41 The SOFA replaced this
agreement on July 9, 1966, which marked a departure from the law
of the flag.4 6 Korea and the United States have amended the Korea
SOFA twice since its conclusion in 1966.
The first amendment was agreed to on February 1, 1991. The most
important aspect of the amendment was the repeal of the so-called
"automatic waiver" clause. 47 This clause requested the Korean

government notify U.S. military authorities of its intent to exercise
jurisdiction over crimes that fell within its primary jurisdiction
within fifteen days after the occurrence of such crimes.48 In other
words, Korea presumably waived its primary jurisdiction unless it
communicated its will to proceed with proper criminal process.

Therefore, it was easy for South Korea to use the waiver in favor of
U.S. forces. Once the automatic waiver was done away with under

the first revision, the United States was required to make a request
for the waiver, to which Korea should give sympathetic
consideration to in cases where it has primary jurisdiction.49
On January 18, 2001, the Korea SOFA was revised for the second
time in response to concerns over environmental damage by U.S.

Necessary?, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 717, 731 (1996) (stating that the law of
the flag was dominant in most World War I agreements because the United States
believed that subjecting fighting forces to another country's jurisdiction would
constrain the military's ability to discipline its soldiers).
45. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at Ill (stating that the agreement
concluded during the Korean War gave considerable favors to U.S forces in
Korea).
46. See DAE-SUN KIM, supra note 16, at 368 (explaining the legal implications
of the Korea SOFA in terms of general international law).
47. See id. at 369 (stating that the automatic waiver clause was one of the most
important evidences of how unfair the Korea SOFA was before revisions)..
48. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 46 (explaining the operation and effects
of the automatic waiver clause in the Korea SOFA).
49. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3(c) (providing that the
state who has primary jurisdiction "shall give sympathetic consideration to a
request from the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State
considers such waiver to be of particular importance").
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military activities and increasing crimes committed by U.S. armed
forces members in Korea.50

II. IS THE INEQUALITY THEORY VALID?:
REEXAMINATION OF THE KOREA SOFA
Several purposes of the SOFA have been identified. Given the
uncertainty of the customary international law on visiting foreign
forces, states generally rely on the SOFA to clarify and to stabilize
the legal status of foreign service members.5 In terms of bilateral or
multilateral state relations, the objective of a SOFA is to "share the
sovereign prerogative" between the two states and develop a
comprehensive agreement based upon each states' interests and
needs.5 2 Another main aspect of SOFAs is to guarantee basic
individual rights and liberties of service members. 3
These purposes are correlative with one another, but their relative
importance may vary. As U.S. lawmakers pursued a policy of

50. See Jennifer Gannon, Renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement
Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVT'L. L. & POL'Y 263, 263-64 (2000) (describing the pressures that the Korean
government placed on the U.S. government to renegotiate the SOFA and the
implications of its subsequent revision); see also Young-won Kim, supra note 43,
at 112-14 (stating that during the second revision, the two countries concluded a
Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection). As for the
issues of criminal jurisdiction, Korea was allowed, inter alia, to maintain custody
of the accused or to have earlier transfer of custody over certain heinous crimes, as
the case may be. Id.
51.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 375 (5th ed.

1998) (discussing how the NATO SOFA provides a structure for dealing with the
military jurisdiction problem); see also Erickson, supra note 10, at 140 (explaining
that the primary purpose of a SOFA is not to immunize forces from criminal
sanctions, but rather apply military laws which take into consideration status,
custom, and military requirements).
52. See Erickson, supra note 10, at 140 (explaining that SOFAs are only
effective instruments when both parties to the agreement understand the purpose of
sharing the sovereign prerogative and believe that their interests are adequately
represented).
53. See Norman, supra note 44, at 734 (stating that SOFAs "retrieve
jurisdiction for the United States," which preserves the constitutional rights of a
serviceman who is serving in a foreign country).
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maximizing jurisdiction to the greatest extent possible 4 and
protecting the due process rights of U.S. service members, the
possibility of offending the sovereign sentiment of the receiving
states has become higher.
South Korea, as a beneficiary of U.S. military aid, has been
vulnerable to U.S. pressure. The general superiority of influences the
United States has enjoyed as a superpower may be reinforced in the
context of military and political patronage within specific regions
such as South Korea.5 5 Also, the tensions that continue in the Korean
peninsula even after the end of the Cold-War era have made it
impossible to reduce Korean dependence on U.S. military support.56
Consequently, some critics advance the argument that the Korea
SOFA is an unequal agreement.5 7 This argument especially focuses
on the provisions of the agreement related to criminal jurisdiction
and the processes concerning crimes U.S. service members commit
in Korea. 8

54. See Major Mark R. Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Environmental
Offenses Committed Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say No, 40 A.F. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1996) (explaining that this desire to maximize jurisdiction stems from
the Senate Resolution on the NATO SOFA). Adopted on July 15, 1953, this
resolution called for a compulsory waiver request in cases where the offender's
commander believed that the serviceman's rights would not be fully
constitutionally protected. Id.
55. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 9, at 251 (asserting that none of the
countries in East Asia is in a position to negotiate with the United States as an
equal partner).
56. See id. at 269-70 (stating that countries, such as South Korea, rely on the
U.S. military's assistance in maintaining their national security).
57. See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 619-20 (discussing unequal treaties in the
context of the Vienna Convention). Communist states advanced the proposition
that treaties that are not based upon sovereign equality were void. Id. Examples of
such unequal treaties are the ones by which weak countries provide a wide range of
economic privileges or military installations with foreign powers. Id. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, does not include inequality among
the grounds for invalidating treaties, and it is widely regarded as not forming the
principle of positive law. Id.
58. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 36; see also Kirk & Francis, supra note
9, at 270 (stating that some women's organizations in East Asia argue that the fact
that the SOFA governs soldiers' criminal conduct leads to confusing and
inconsistent results).
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There are several criteria to measure the equality of legal
mechanisms embodied in certain international agreements. One of
them is customary or general international law. 9 As sources of
international law, treaty and customary law are basically equal in
their legal status and effect, 60 and a newly concluded treaty
supersedes existing customary law unless the existing rule is jus
cogens. 61 Therefore, it is possible that state parties may alter some
equitable principles of customary or general international law by
agreeing on a treaty in favor of one or several parties with stronger
bargaining power. In this respect, customary or general international
law may be useful in discussing the inequalities embodied in the
Korea SOFA.
The criterion critics more widely adopt is the NATO SOFA. 62 The
NATO SOFA has become a global standard after which other
SOFAs are modeled.63 Moreover, it is perceived that the relative
bargaining power of European NATO states against the United
States is generally greater than that of East Asian states,64 and
provisions similar to those of the NATO SOFA seem to be able to

59. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-45 (7th ed. 1997) (explaining definition, elements and
evidence of customary international law).
60. See id. at 56-57 (describing the hierarchical relationship between customary
international law and treaties and explaining in which situations one overrides the
other).
61. See id. at 57-58 (explaining that a treaty should be considered void if it
violates basic principles of international law). This principle is codified in Article
53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id. This Article provides that
a treaty is void if it "conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law," which
is a "norm accepted and recognized by the international community." Id. at 57.
62. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 48, 50; see also DAE-SUN KIM, supra
note 16, at 372-78.
63. See Erickson, supra note 10, at 141 (stating that although it was not
intended as such, the NATO SOFA has become a worldwide standard). When
negotiating a SOFA, the United States seeks to receive comparable or greater
protection for its forces than that embodied in the NATO SOFA. Id.
64. See Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: U.S. Interests in
Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 215, 226 (1999) (explaining that the
NATO SOFA is one of the few reciprocal SOFAs and that few nations outside of
NATO could exercise jurisdiction over their own forces within the United States).

2003]

KOREA- UNITED STA TES

avoid criticism.

65

SOFA

1117

To many South Koreans, the SOFA between

66
neighboring Japan and the United States also serves as a criterion.

With the standards mentioned above in mind, attention will now

be paid to the unequal treaty argument about the criminal jurisdiction
and process provisions in the Korea SOFA.
A. SHARING OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN THE SOFA

As a preliminary issue, it is necessary to examine the distribution
of criminal jurisdiction in the Korea SOFA. The Korea SOFA is
based on two types of jurisdiction, exclusive and concurrent. An
identical framework is found in the NATO SOFA. 67 Article XXII of
the Korea SOFA provides that the U.S. military authorities have the
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of U.S. armed

forces "with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its
security, punishable by the law of the United States, but not by the
law of the Republic of Korea."6 8 This exclusive jurisdiction applies

to Korean authorities in the same way with respect to offenses by the
U.S service members that are punishable by Korean law but not by
U.S. law.69 In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is

concurrent, the authorities of Korea have primary jurisdiction, but an
exception exists in relation to offenses committed solely against the
property or security of the United States or solely against another

U.S. armed forces member, and offenses arising out of any act or

65. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 124-25.
66. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 48-50; see also Young-won Kim, supra
note 43, at 112, 124-25.
67. See Hemmert, supra note 64, at 222 (explaining that under exclusive
jurisdiction, the sending state retains jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed
by members of the force). Under concurrent jurisdiction, the sending and receiving
states share jurisdiction, with one state retaining primary jurisdiction. Id. The state
with primary jurisdiction has the ability to waive that jurisdiction or choose not to
prosecute a given offense. Id.
68. Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 2(a).
69. See id. art. XXII, para. 2(b) (providing that "Korean authorities have the
right to exclusive jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces or
civilian component, and their dependents, with respect to offenses, including
offenses related to the security of the Republic of Korea, punishable by its law but
not by the law of the United States").
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omission done in the performance of official duty.70 Also, the state
retaining primary jurisdiction should "give sympathetic consideration
to a request from the other state for a waiver of its right in cases
where that other state considers such waiver to be of particular
importance."71
This provision is certainly not to be regarded as unequal in that it
is basically the same as the relevant provision of the NATO SOFA.
The comparison with the customary international law standard,
however, might produce somewhat of an equivocal outcome, since
the state of customary law concerning foreign forces on the territory
of friendly nations is unclear in itself.72
In practice, foreign forces had enjoyed complete immunity from a
given receiving state's territorial jurisdiction until the 1950s, and this
practice was based on the customary international law doctrine of the
law of the flag.73 Two factors justified the law of the flag doctrine.
First, military commanders could more effectively monitor and
control their own troops, and second, it is presumed that an army
should apply its own military law to be able to maintain military
discipline during movements across foreign soil.74 The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden 5 case contains dicta explaining the essence
of such a principle. Jurists have adopted this famous case to support

70. See id. art. XXII, para. 3(a), (b) (enumerating the instances where the
United States retains jurisdiction and the cases where Korea can exercise
jurisdiction).
71. See id. art. XXII, para. 3(c).
72. See BROWNLIE, supra note 5 1, at 373-75 (discussing how different writers
have approached the subject of visiting forces). Some writers apply principles
discussed in dicta in the Schooner Exchange case, while others examine the subject
in light of the NATO SOFA and other bilateral agreements. Id.
73. See Hemmert, supra note 64, at 218 (explaining that from the time when
the Schooner Exchange case was decided in 1812 to the 1950s, with the receiving
state's consent, the sending state was completely immune to criminal prosecution
on foreign soil).
74. See id. at 218-19 (explaining that the law of the flag was widely accepted
internationally, based largely upon this reasoning).
75. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (holding that an American citizen could not
assert a claim of ownership over a French ship docked in U.S. port).
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various, even conflicting, opinions on sovereign immunity and the
status of military forces of friendly foreign troops.76

In Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall established the rule
that "a country is implied to waive the exercise of its jurisdiction
when it allows foreign troops to pass through its boundaries."77 The
law of the flag's use is on the decline as more states become parties
to SOFAs, such as the NATO SOFA, which allows the receiving
state to exercise jurisdiction over certain categories of offenses
members of foreign forces commit." Quite a few commentators
suggest that today the receiving state should have complete
jurisdiction over foreign troops inside its territory without an express
waiver of jurisdiction through an agreement.79 Therefore, the sending
state needs to conclude SOFAs in order to retain a certain amount of
control over its own forces stationed abroad.80
However, there are some other ways to interpret the current state
of law. First, there is authority supporting the view that the allocation
of jurisdiction of the NATO SOFA may pass into customary
international law.8' A court of the receiving state that does not have a
SOFA in effect with the sending state might find it necessary to
declare it had no jurisdiction over offenses by members of foreign
forces arising out of official duty. Moreover, one commentator
suggests that the most satisfactory principle today is found in Justice

76. See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 373 (asserting that the Schooner
Exchange case "has been used to support a variety of propositions about
immunities of armed forces").
77. Daniel L. Pagano, CriminalJurisdictionof United States Forces in Europe,
4 PACE Y. B. INT'L L. 189, 191 (1992).
78. See Hemmert, supra note 64, at 220 (describing how NATO SOFA
provides a basis for similar bilateral agreements involving the United States). The
NATO SOFA eliminated many of the problems and the inconsistent policies
associated with stationing troops on foreign soil. Id.
79. See id. (stating that the United States adopts the view that in the absence of
a waiver, the receiving state has full jurisdiction over troops on its territory during
peacetime).
80. See id. at 221 (explaining that under the modem view, SOFAs are
necessary to ensure that the sending state maintains jurisdiction over its forces).
81. See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 375 (stating that in the foreword to
Lazareff's, Status of Military Forces Under Current InternationalLaw, Professor
Baxter expresses the viewpoint that the NATO SOFA may become custom).
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Marshall's words advocating for the implied waiver of jurisdictional
power with the focus on the need to secure the integrity and
efficiency of military troops.8"
Different writers have different opinions on the modem principles
of customary international law concerning the subject, and much
depends on different circumstances and conditions in each case
contemplated. In a hypothetical situation where there were no
SOFAs regulating jurisdiction over the offenses by service members
of the U.S forces in Korea, it would be difficult to expect Korean
courts to exercise jurisdiction based on the principle of territorial
sovereignty without any regard to the existence of official duty
situations or the purpose of the presence of the U.S. forces.
Therefore, it cannot be easily said that the jurisdiction system in the
SOFA is an alteration of customary law for the United States'
benefit.
Even though the SOFA jurisdiction system is different from
customary law, what matters more is that, as mentioned earlier, it is
almost the same as the provisions in other SOFAs, such as the
NATO SOFA. The NATO SOFA rejected the law of the flag to the
receiving states' advantage, which showed the concession on the part
of the exporters of troops.83
These considerations may explain why criticism of the Korea
SOFA is focused on criminal process provisions, rather than the
distribution of criminal jurisdiction.

82. See id. at 374 (suggesting that Justice Marshall's opinion in the Schooner
Exchange case is the most satisfying in explaining immunity). Marshall based his
concept of immunity on an implied waiver by the receiving state. Id.
83. See Kimberly C. Priest-Hamilton, Who Really Should Have Exercised
Jurisdiction over the Military Pilots Implicated in the 1998 Italy Gondola
Accident?, 65 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 605, 615-16 (2000) (explaining that some
nationalists in the United States strongly denounced the NATO SOFA at its
conclusion because they regarded it as subjecting U.S forces to laws of unreliable
foreign countries).
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B. PROVISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCESS AND RECIPROCITY
1. Transfer of Custody and Certain Serious Crimes
The most controversial issue in the Korea SOFA was Article
XXII, which stipulates as to the custody of the accused members of
the U.S. forces.84 The SOFA provided that custody should remain
with U.S. military authorities until the completion of all judicial
proceedings and until Korea requested the transfer of custody.85
Korea and the United States revised this custody provision in the
second amendment of the Korea SOFA in January 2001.86 Now, an
accused member of the U.S. forces over whom Korea is to exercise
jurisdiction remains in U.S. military custody until Korea "indicts"
him.87 In fact, according to the Agreed Minutes to the SOFA, this

84. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 116.
85. Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 5(c). Article XXII states:
The custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or
civilian component, or of a dependent, over whom the Republic of Korea is to
exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the military authorities of
the United States, remain with the military authorities of the United States
pending the conclusion of all judicial proceedings and until custody is
requested by the authorities of the Republic of Korea. If he is in the hands of
the Republic of Korea, he shall, on request, be handed over to the military
authorities of the United States and remain in their custody pending
completion of all judicial proceedings and until custody is requested by the
authorities of the Republic of Korea.
Id.
86. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Korea Amending the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding
Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic
of Korea of July 9, 1996, Jan. 18, 2001, U.S.-S. Korea [hereinafter Amended
Korea SOFA] (amending the original Korean SOFA), available at
http://www.korea.army.mil/sofa/2001-english%20text.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2003).
87. See id. (replacing the original treaty language to require that custody "shall
remain with the military authorities of the United States until he is indicted by the
Republic of Korea"); see also Jaime M. Gher, Status of ForcesAgreements: Tools
to Further Effective Foreign Policy and Lessons to be Learned from the United
States-Japan Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 227, 239 (2002) (noting that the
Japan SOFA contains a similar provision).
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provision applies only to twelve categories of serious crimes, such as
murder and rape. 8
The South Korean government explains that these twelve
categories are the most serious crimes U.S. service members have
committed in the past ten years, and other relatively less serious
crimes do not necessitate the transfer of custody at the time of
indictment.8 9 On the contrary, critics believe that the custody
provisions of the SOFAs thwart and abrogate the host nation's
investigative and prosecutorial rights.9 0 Further, it is argued that the
United States' efforts to frustrate prosecution have actually resulted
in an increase in the number and severity of crimes by American
troops in foreign territory.9"
In the case of the NATO SOFA, the sending state may retain
custody of an accused until the final resolution of the criminal case.92
In this respect, the Korea SOFA confers more rights on the receiving
state than the NATO SOFA does, which makes the former less

"unequal." In light of customary or general international law,

88. The categories of cases in which the custody is transferred to Korea at the
time of indictment include:
murder, rape (including quasi-rape and sexual intercourse with a minor under
thirteen years of age), kidnapping for ransoms, trafficking in illegal drugs,
manufacturing illegal drugs for the purposes of distribution, arson, robbery
with a dangerous weapon, attempts to commit the foregoing offenses, assault
resulting in death, driving under the influence of alcohol, resulting in death,
fleeing the crime scene after committing a traffic accident resulting in death,
offenses which include one or more of the above-referenced offenses as lesser
included offenses...
Amendments to the Agreed Minutes of July 9, 1966 to the Agreement Under
Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United
States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, Jan. 18, 2001, U.S.-S. Korea
[hereinafter Amended Agreed Minutes] (amending the Agreed Minutes of the
original
Korea
SOFA),
available
at
http://www.korea.army.mil/sofa/2001sofaenglish%20text.pdf (last visited Mar.
23, 2003).
89. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 117.
90. See id. at 235, 239.
91. See id. at 239 (arguing that this criticism was made with regard to the
situations in Japan, but the same logic could apply to Korea).
92. See Gher, supra note 87, at 235 (explaining that this abrogation of a host
country's rights is often a contentious point in judicial disputes).
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however, it is clear that the SOFA provision on custody of the

accused gives major privileges to U.S. service members because, if
not for such a provision, international law would grant the receiving
state the right to take immediate custody and prosecute under its
law.93

Therefore, the question of whether the custody provision of the
Korea SOFA satisfies the criteria of "inequality" is met with
equivocal answers; it does not in terms of the NATO SOFA, but it

does in terms of customary international law.
2. Double Jeopardyand Asymmetric Appeal Rights

Double jeopardy is defined as a constitutional guarantee "against
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction,
and against multiple punishments for the same offense." 94 The
asymmetric appeal rights attached to the double jeopardy principle is
what distinguishes the Korea SOFA from other SOFAs: other
SOFAs do not provide for asymmetric appeal rights. 95

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Fifth Amendment introduced the
double jeopardy principle, of which the relevant part provides, " nor

shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

93. See id. (discussing the fact that the NATO SOFA and other agreements
modeled after it are specifically designed to protect Americans by securing
custody).
94. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (6th ed. 1998) (defining double
jeopardy); Major Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign CriminalJurisdiction,37
A.F.L. REV. 169, 177 (1994) (discussing that although the double jeopardy
principle in domestic laws is used to prevent the multiple prosecution of the same
offense by "the same sovereign," the principle reflected in SOFAs also limits
prosecution by different sovereigns); Carl Edman & Cynthia E. Richman, Double
Jeopardy, 89 GEO. L.J. 1439, 1467-68 (2001) (highlighting that the double
jeopardy clause prohibits use of the dual sovereignty doctrine, which allows
separate sovereigns with distinct sources of power to bring successive prosecutions
for the same criminal act); see also NATO SOFA, supra note 11, art. VII, para. 8
(providing in part, "[t]he NATO SOFA provides that, where an accused has been
tried by the authorities of one contracting party and has been acquitted, or
convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence, or has been pardoned, he may
not be tried again for the same offense within the same territory by another
contracting party"); Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 8 (providing for
the same principle in a similar way).
95. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 119.
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jeopardy of life or limb.
,,96 There are many essential values that
justify the Double Jeopardy Clause. First of all, it protects against
needless "embarrassment, expenses, and psychological trauma."97
The Double Jeopardy Clause also preserves the finality of judgments
and prevents unreasonably burdensome government activities
because constant jeopardy of re-prosecution is likely to oppress
individuals.98 Asymmetric appeal rights, one aspect of the American
double jeopardy principal, refer to the fact that "criminal defendants
may appeal convictions, but prosecutors have highly attenuated
rights to appeal acquittals."9 9 In the United States, the government

may not appeal an acquittal if it would warrant a retrial. °0 Limitation
of prosecutorial rights of appeal is not without adverse effects, 10 but
it does protect the integrity of the justice system by reducing false
conviction errors and litigation costs. 02 This asymmetry is quite

different from other countries.103 Many other countries have
principles similar to the double jeopardy of the United States, but
differ in the way they protect individuals from the threat of repeated
prosecution. 0 4 Most civil law countries allow a prosecutor to appeal

96. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (protecting against unreasonable searches and
seizures, adopted in 1791).
97. See Jennifer E. Costa, Double Jeopardy and Non Bis In Idem: Principlesof
Fairness, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 181, 184-85 (1998) (justifying the
importance of double jeopardy protections in the United States).
98. See id. (using U.S. Supreme Court decisions to outline the underlying
protections against double jeopardy).
99. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy's Asymmetric Appeal
Rights: What Purpose Do They Serve?, 82 B.U.L. REV. 341, 343 (2002)
(examining the practical effects of double jeopardy protections on litigation).
100. See Costa, supra note 97, at 188 (examining the effects of barring
subsequent prosecution through the double jeopardy clause).
101. See Joshua Steinglass, The Justice System in Jeopardy: The Prohibitionon
Government Appeals ofAcquittals, 31 IND. L. REV. 353, 381-82 (1998) (examining
the various policy considerations of limiting appeals).
102. See Khanna, supra note 99, at 343 (studying the effects of limiting
asymmetric appeal rights).
103. See Costa, supra note 97, at 182-83 (comparing protections afforded by

various nations).
104. See id. (suggesting that most civil law countries define double jeopardy as
res judicata or non bis in idem).
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errors of law and questions of fact.10 5 In Korea, Article 13 of the
Constitution provides, in part, that no citizen may be punished twice
for the same offense.0 6 As a civil law country,0 7 Korea adopts the
position that prosecutors may appeal an acquittal without violating
the double jeopardy principle. 08
Under the Korea SOFA, however, in any case the Korean
authorities prosecute, the prosecution cannot appeal a judgment of
"not guilty" or an acquittal, nor any judgment which the accused
does not appeal, except upon grounds of errors of law. 109 Here, the
appeal rights are asymmetric in that the Korean prosecution cannot
appeal an acquittal except upon grounds of errors of law, while U.S.
service members prosecuted by the Korean authorities have the right
to appeal a conviction or sentence.1 0 This asymmetry, which is close
to the American interpretation of the double jeopardy principle,
seems to perfectly satisfy the inequality criteria discussed earlier. As
for the customary or general international law criterion, were it not
for the Korea SOFA, the Korean prosecution would have a right to
appeal in line with Korean criminal rules because, under the
territorial principle of state jurisdiction, Korea could apply its own
105. See id. at 190 (detailing the non bis in idem policies and protections
afforded by various civil law countries).
106. See S. KOREA CONST. art 13, para. 1 (translation supplied by present
authors) (providing an English translation of the Korean Constitution that uses the
phrase "nor shall be placed in double jeopardy," but the original Korean text does
not
include
the
term
"double
jeopardy"),
available
at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/preamble/english.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
107. See Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on
South Korea, 22 S. ILL. U.L.J. 71, 72-73 (1997) (providing a history of the
development of the Korean legal system). Under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945,
Japan's version of continental European law was oppressively stamped in Korea,
and its influence still persists, particularly in criminal law. Id.
108. See David M. Waters, Korean Constitutionalism and the 'Special Act' to
Prosecute Former Presidents Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae- Woo, 10 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 461, 479 (1996) (comparing United States and Korean double jeopardy
protections).
109. See Amended Agreed Minutes, supra note 88, art. XXII, para. 9 (expanding
on Article XXII paragraph nine, listing the protections afforded to one when
prosecuted by the Korean government).
110. See id. (providing that the accused can request a "re-examination of the
evidence, including new evidence and witnesses, as a basis for new findings of fact
by the appellate court").
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criminal laws on its soil."' Clearly, U.S. service members are given
privileges that no other ordinary foreigners or locals possess in
Korea. Comparison with the NATO SOFA also results in the same
conclusion. Nothing in the NATO SOFA denies prosecutors of the
2
receiving states the right to appeal."
As far as the asymmetry of appeal rights is concerned, the Korea
SOFA seems to fit the unequal treaty criticism.' On the contrary,
the provision of asymmetric right of appeal could help to secure the
rights of U.S. service members in South Korea. It also might
encourage the Korean prosecution to do a better job because it is
given only one shot at obtaining a conviction at the initial trial" 4
pertaining to serious crimes involving members of the U.S. forces.
Nevertheless, it is true that the provision of the asymmetric appeal
rights runs against the sovereign prerogative of South Korea to
follow within reasonable limits its own legal determination embodied
in its legal system. Suggesting a more practical evaluation of the
provision, Korean officials say that, in Germany and Japan, which
are parties to the SOFAs without asymmetric appeal rights, the local
prosecutions of both countries have never actually used such appeal
rights in criminal cases where they had the primary jurisdiction over
the accused U.S. service members in their territories." 5 It may be that
realistic issues of sovereignty have not yet arisen out of the
provision.

111. See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 303 (discussing various international law
doctrines).
112. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 119 (stating that the Korea SOFA
contains the provision of asymmetric appeal rights that is not found in the NATO
SOFA).
113. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 51 (arguing that the Korea SOFA is
unfair because it confers upon members of U.S forces the rights that other SOFAs
do not).
114. See Khanna, supra note 99, at 343 (arguing that, in addition, having only
one opportunity to obtain a conviction may increase aggregate litigation costs and
the possibility of a false conviction).
115. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 119 (arguing that the asymmetry of
appeal rights contained in the Korea SOFA is hardly an issue in light of actual
application).
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3. Non-reciprocalAgreement

Attention is often paid to the fact that the NATO SOFA is a rare
reciprocal agreement. 1 6 The NATO SOFA applies to foreign forces
on the U.S. territory, while the Korea SOFA has no application for
Korean armed forces members staying on American soil. Of course,
Korea has no military forces or installations deployed in the United
States in the same way that the United States does in Korea.
Therefore, the Korea SOFA applies only to U.S. forces in Korea.117
It is said that such non-reciprocity is based upon the assumption
"that foreign troops will automatically receive a fair trial in

American courts."1"8 This assumption, in turn, is evidence that the
United States is not "playing fair" and perceives itself superior to
other nations. 9 The fact that the NATO SOFA is reciprocal while
SOFAs with South Korea and Japan are not appears to demonstrate
that the United States is prejudiced against Asian nations. 20 Due to
these inconsistencies, many suggest the United States should revise
these SOFAs to contain a reciprocity provision. 21

116. See Gher, supra note 87, at 236 (underscoring the role of the NATO SOFA
as a "world standard" for all SOFAs); see also Norman, supra note 44, at 738-39
(citing one unique aspect of the NATO SOFA as its guaranteed protection of
Miranda rights); Erickson, supra note 10, at 152 n.45 (explaining that the
reciprocity of SOFAs are related to their nature as executive agreements or treaties
in the sense of U.S. constitutional law).
117. See Norman, supra note 44, at 738 (pointing out that the Japan SOFA is
also a non-reciprocal agreement).
118. See id. at 739 (suggesting that some critics demand reciprocity because it is
"presumptuous" to assume that foreign troops will be guaranteed a fair trial in the
American legal system).
119. Gher, supra note 87, at 241.
120. Id.
121. See Norman, supra note 44, at 738-39 (stating that the United States should
make the SOFA with Japan reciprocal in order to promote the nations' security
relationship and show equality between the two parties); see also Gher, supra note
87, at 253 (arguing that the United States-Japan SOFA should be made reciprocal
because there is no valid reason why such rights should only be given to European
nations).
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When it comes to the Korea SOFA, however, it is doubtful that the
non-reciprocity status is of any significance.122 The official title of
the Korea SOFA is "Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the
Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of
2
the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea.'
According to Article IV, Korea grants, and the United States accepts,
the right to "dispose" the U.S. forces in and about the territory of
Korea as determined by mutual agreement. 24 The two countries
agreed to the deployment of U.S. forces in Korea, but not vice
versa. 25 The experiences of the Korean war and continuing threat
from communist North Korea explain the non-reciprocity with regard
to the deployment of forces.' 26 It is quite difficult to contemplate the
need for Korean forces to be stationed on American soil in the way
U.S. forces are stationed in Korea, thus making a reciprocal Korea
SOFA hardly serves any purpose. 127 To make the Korea SOFA
reciprocal, one must first not only change the Mutual Defense Treaty
allowing non-reciprocal deployment of forces, but also change the
entire situation and history related to the military alliance between
Korea and the United States, making evident that non-reciprocity can
128
hardly be seen as an issue, at least in relation to the Korea SOFA.
C. WAIVER OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

It is known that the United States adopted the policy of
maximizing jurisdiction over its service members accused of crimes

122. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 9, at 231 (reasoning that since World War
11, the employment of U.S. forces in Korea has been mainly for the protection of
Korea).
123. Korea SOFA, supra note 3.
124. See Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 25. art. IV.
125. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 9, at 232 (stating that there are "ninety-five
U.S. bases and approximately 37,000 U.S. troops" in Korea).
126. See id. (describing the current protectionist relationship between the United
States and South Korea).
127. See id. at 231-33 (explaining that the presence of U.S. troops in Korea are
generally focused on the goals of stabilizing and protecting South Korea).
128. See id. (depicting the history and reasoning behind the U.S. military
presence in Korea).
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in host countries to the greatest extent possible.1 29 In cases where the
receiving state has the primary right of jurisdiction, U.S. military
authorities seek to secure jurisdiction by requesting a waiver as
provided in the SOFA. 13' The United States always requests a waiver
in cases covered by the NATO SOFA.' The policy of seeking a
waiver takes different forms: for example, the agreement with
Germany establishes an automatic waiver of Germany's primary
right, but, at the same time, gives Germany the right to recall the
waiver under certain circumstances.1 31 Under the current Korea
SOFA, "the authorities of the State having the primary right shall
give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of
the other States for a waiver of its right in cases where that other
State considers such waiver to be of particular importance."'13 This
provision of "sympathetic consideration" is found in almost every
SOFA the United States has entered into. 134 Waiver mechanism may
be justified by comity and mutual trust. 35 Granting a requested
waiver means trying and punishing the offenders under the justice
system of the requesting party, but it does not mean immunizing
36
them.
However, the trouble with the waiver provision of the Korea
SOFA is two-fold because, first, Korea has waived its right to a
greater extent than other receiving states have. "31 According to
statistics of the 1990s, Korea's rate of actual exercise of jurisdiction
129. See Ruppert, supra note 54, at 8 (stating that this U.S. policy stems from a
resolution the U.S. Senate passed on the NATO SOFA).
130. See id. at 8-9 (explaining the U.S. policy formulated by the U.S. Senate's
resolution and how the policy is implemented).
131. See Pagano, supra note 77, at 208.
132. See Ruppert, supra note 54, at 9 (explaining that Germany may recall the
waiver when interests in the administration of justice require that Germany have
jurisdiction).
133.

Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3(c).

134. Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 45.
135. Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 117 (explaining that the special
characteristics of the sovereignty affect application of legal principles).
136. See Pagano, supra note 77, at 207 (describing the system of waiver under
the NATO SOFA).
137. Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 47; JANG-HIE LEE ET AL., supra note 9, at
107.
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was, on average, 3% out of all criminal cases over which it had the
primary right of jurisdiction. 138 In other words, Korea handed over
almost 97% of such cases to U.S. military jurisdiction at the request
of a waiver. 39 It is true that many states "have acceded to U.S.
requests for waivers in a significant number of cases,"40 but only
Germany seems to match Korea in this respect.' 4' The U.S. military
authorities suggest that American success in securing waivers results
from the confidence other countries have in the U.S. military justice
system, and also from the perception that that U.S. military
authorities deal more firmly with offenders than local courts do. 142 It
is not clear, however, that such explanations could apply to the
situation in Korea because Korea may give more importance to the
fact that U.S. service members in their country are there to protect its
people from a possible attack by North Korea. 14 Even in cases where
Korea actually exercised its jurisdiction, it granted special pardon to
quite a few of the convicted not long after they started serving their
time. 44 Secondly, it is often suggested that a U.S. court martial
conviction in a foreign country results "in more lenient sentences
than criminal trials in the United States."'' 45 Some critics claim that
138. See JANG-HIE LEE ET AL., supra note 9, at 107 (reporting that the rate of
actual exercise ofjurisdiction was 3% in 1998 and it dropped to 2.8% in 1999).
139. Id.
140. Ruppert, supra note 54, at 7.
141. DAE-SUN KIM, supra note 16 (comparing different states hosting U.S.
forces in terms of the rate of waiver of primary jurisdiction).
142. See United States Army Europe, & Seventh Army International Affairs
Division, Recall Rate, Ten-Year Analysis: 1977-1986 (1986), noted in Captain
Robin L. Davis, Waiver and Recall of Primary Concurrent Jurisdiction in
Germany, in 1988-MAY THE ARMY LAW 30, 33 (1988) (stipulating that
German public prosecutors and courts are growing more confident in the U.S.
military justice system).
143.

See NATIONAL

CAMPAIGN FOR ERADICATION OF CRIMES BY

U.S.

TROOPS IN

(S. Korea) (reporting that in many criminal cases involving U.S. service
members, Korean judges have taken into consideration the fact that accused
soldiers have contributed to the national defense of Korea as a member of the U.S.
forces), at http://usacrime.or.kr/frame-SOFA.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
KOREA

144. See Seung-Hwan Choi & Eun-joo Park, Recent Cases Relating to the SOFA
Between the Republic of Korea and the United States, 5.2 SEOUL INT'L L.J. 60
(1998) (stating that such pardons are granted to ordinary local prisoners as well as
convicted American soldiers).
145. Gher, supra note 87, at 240.

2003]

KOREA- UNITED STA TES

SOFA

1131

when the United States secures jurisdiction by waivers, the resulting
punishments are "a slap on the wrist" that cannot deter criminal
146
offenses of U.S. service members.

Serious crimes U.S. service members have committed have often
galvanized strong public protest in Korea. 147 The perception that the
authorities of both states respond unsatisfactorily to such crimes
148
must operate behind public anger.

D. OFFICIAL DUTY
1. Scope of Official Duty: ExceptionalProvisionsof the Korea SOFA
One of the most controversial issues of the NATO SOFA is the
question of what constitutes "an act or omission done in the
performance of official duty."' 149 The Korea SOFA also includes the
same provision, and hence, the same controversy: U.S. military
authorities have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S.
armed forces members in relation to offenses arising out of any act or
omission done in the performances of official duty. 50 There are two
general issues in the interpretation of this official duty provision: "(1)
when does an offense arise out of an act or omission done in the
performance of official duty; (2) who has the right to make this
determination?"'5

On the first issue of the scope of official duty, negotiators who
participated in the making of the NATO SOFA advanced a variety of

146. Id. at 254 (explaining that U.S. service members who are found guilty
"generally only receive non-judicial punishments or court martials").
147. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 9, at 257 (describing incidences where
crimes U.S. soldiers committed in Korea caused public protests).
148. See id. at 258 (reporting that women's groups in Korea argue that the
Korean government should ensure that U.S. troops who commit crimes in Korea
are severely punished or, at a minimum, ensure that they do not escape
punishment).
149. Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 622.
150. Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3.
151. JOSEPH M. SNEE & A. KENNETH PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 46 (1957).
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opinions.' 52 Italy, for example, proposed additional qualifications
such as "within the limits" of official duty.'53 Belgium "wished to
reserve judgment in respect to cases in which the victim was a
national of the receiving State." 5 4 It seemed that states that would
predominantly act as receiving parties preferred a narrower standard
to secure wider territorial jurisdiction over foreign armed forces
members.' 55 The United States wanted the concept not to be unduly
limited because the military authorities should have control over the
application of military law and regulations to the performance of
official duty in order to maintain military discipline. 5 6 The United
States, as a major sending state, has not pursued any concise
explanation of the scope of official duty in the application of the
NATO SOFA.' 57 The NATO states have failed to produce any agreed
definition.'58 Because the NATO SOFA provides no guidelines,
jurisdictional conflicts may arise when an offense is committed by a
member of the sending state's armed force in the receiving state,
seemingly during the performance of official duty. 59
The two most common opinions discussed within NATO are the
"opposing explanations represented by Italy and the United
States." 160 Italy advocates a strictly defined concept by adopting the

152. See id. at 46-48 (describing the different definitions of what constitutes

"official duty" proposed by NATO members).

153. Id. at 47.
154. Id. at 46.
155. See Lepper, supra note 94, at 176 (explaining the differing opinions
between those states that would receive foreign troops and those that would
provide such troops).
156. Id.
157. See SNEE & PYE, supra note 151, at 47 (describing the American military
authorities' undefined position on the issue of what constitutes a service person's
"official duty").
158. See Lepper, supra note 94, at 176 (stating that the NATO states were
unable to agree upon a definition of "official duty" and to this day a definition still
does not exist).
159. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 624 (holding that differences in
national definitions of "official duty" will cause conflicts in situations of
concurrent jurisdiction).
160. Id.
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phrases "within the limits of that official duty. ' ' 161 The United States,
however, consistently adheres to the position that any act or omission
incidental to the performance of official duty falls within the official
duty category. 162 Neither of the two explanations supports the out-ofdate theory that regarded all acts done by officials while they were
on duty as official acts. 63
While SOFAs do not usually define the concept of official duty,
the Korea SOFA is an interesting exception. 64 It includes additional
provisions on the meaning of the performance of official duty both in
the Agreed Minutes and the Understanding to the SOFA. 165 The
former provides that the term "official duty" does not include all acts
by U.S. armed forces and its civilian component during duty periods,
rather it is meant to apply only to acts that are a function of an
individual's duties. 66 The latter further provides that acts that are a
substantial departure from those required to perform a particular duty
are usually indicative of an act outside of the person's "official
duty."'

167

In this context, one is faced with an interesting question of
whether those additional provisions would place the Korea SOFA in
a special position with regard to the interpretation of "official duty."
Under the NATO SOFA there are no specific guidelines for the
interpretation of the term and thus each country is left to rely on its

161. Id.
162. See SNEE & PYE, supra note 151, at 47-49 (stating that the U.S military
authorities seemed to have applied a concept a little similar to the common-law
concept of "scope of employment").

163. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1167-70 (Sir Robert Jennings &
Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (naming example cases that reflect this old
theory, such as Ministere Public v. Triandaflou).
164. See Ruppert, supra note 54, at 30 (claiming that most SOFAs do not define
the term "official duty"); see also id. at 30 n.205 (noting that the Korean SOFA is
an exception to the norm because it defines what constitutes an official duty).
165. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a),
Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a) (explaining the term official duty).
166. Id. Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a) (noting that not all actions
by U.S. armed forces and its civilian component during their mission on foreign
land are covered under the term "official duty").
167. Id. Agreed Understanding, art. XXII, para. 3(a) (identifying which acts fall
outside official duty).
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own definition,'68 but the Korea SOFA contains more specific
provisions. 69 Therefore, it might be said that there is an agreed
definition of official duty between Korea and the United States. 7 0 If
so, the contracting countries should determine which of the two
conflicting explanations is closer to the agreed definition. The
formula of "offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the
performances of official duty"'' in the Korea SOFA can be
summarized as follows:
A) official duty does not include all acts during on-duty hours;
B) official duty applies only to acts required as functions of those
duties; and
C) substantial departure from the acts required in a particular duty
will usually indicate "not on duty."' 72
Provision A states that certain acts would not constitute the
performance of official duty even though they are done during
periods of time official acts are being done.'73 Provisions B and C are
directly related to the specific definition of the official duty
concept. 14 Provision B is to the effect that only the acts required to
perform the duty fall within the category of official duty, and,
therefore, it can be inferred that acts which are not required as a
function of official duty would not be included in the category even
if they were not private businesses. 1"' Provision C introduces the
concept of "substantial departure."' 76 Acts which constitute
168. E.g. Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 623-24 (noting the different
definitions that the United States and Italy applied to the term "official duty").
169. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3(a), Agreed
Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a) (expanding the definition of "official duty").
170. See id. (noting the definition of the term "official duty").
171. Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3(a)(ii).
172. Id. Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a), Agreed Understanding art. XXII,
para. 3(a) (establishing the requirements for an act to constitute part of one's
official duty).
173. Id. art XXII, para. 3(a)(ii).
174. See id. Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a), Agreed Understanding art
XXII, para. 3(a) (defining the extent of official duty).
175. See id. Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a) (stating that only those acts
necessary to the function of one's duty are included in the definition official duty).
176. Id. Agreed Understanding art XXII, para. 3(a)
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substantial departure from a particular duty are most likely outside of
the official duty.177
The link between Provisions A and B calls for some consideration.
At first glance, Provision B seems to place strict limits on the scope
of official acts because the phrase "required as functions" may be
interchangeable with, or at least similar to, "within the limits." '78
This may lead to the Italian interpretation, which says official acts
should be within the limits of official duty.179 It is thought, however,
that Provision B cannot be read with such restrictive meaning. Those
who advocate the fairness of the Korea SOFA emphasize Provision
A, explaining that the old theory of "duty hours" as in the
Triandafilou case 80 is no longer effective. This shows that the
essential point of the formula is Provision A, and that Provision B is
just another way of stating the same proposition. 81 It may be that
because Provision A is formulated in negative terminology, a
positive provision such as Provision B is required to supplement it.
In other words, one should read the two provisions contained in the
same article 82 as one integral provision, with the stress on Provision
A.183 The fact that the word "limit" was avoided also supports this
interpretation. Given that the determination of official duty is
practically left in the hands of the U.S military authorities, this
integral provision serves as a minimum standard forbidding the U.S.

177. See id. (noting that acts that are a substantial departure from those required
to perform one's duty are outside the terms of official duty).
178. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(stating that official duties are those which are required as a function of one's
duty).
179. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 623 (asserting that the Italian
interpretation of official duty should include acts done in performance of official
duty as well as acts done within the limits of the official duty).
180. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 163, at 1167-70

(noting that the official duty of crew members of warships extends to acts on shore
in respect to the ship but do not apply to acts on land for pleasure or recreation).
181. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(stating that not all acts committed during service in a foreign country constitute
official acts).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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military authorities to protect its members excessively. 8 4 In the
analysis of the Provisions A and B, it is hard to find any element that
differentiates the Korea SOFA from the NATO SOFA.'85 Thus the
Korea SOFA is not conclusive of the controversy over the scope of
86
official duty. 1
Secondly, the connection between Provisions B and C (or,
Provisions A/B and C, because A and B are read into one statement)
is also unclear. Provision B restricts the official duty to acts required
in a duty,'87 and Provision C states that the official duty category
excludes substantial departures from acts required in a duty.' 88 In
some respects, Provision C might be viewed as pushing the neutral
Provision B closer to the American suggestion.'89 Because the issue
is "substantial" departure, not just simple departure, it may be
possible to regard a limited, non-substantial degree of departure as
falling within the official act. 910
From another point of view, however, Provision C is merely a
tautological comment on Provision B. The choice of words in the
provision is quite loose ("will usually indicate"), and "substantial
departure" may, as a matter of course, be far from the official duty. It

184. Cf Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 617 (noting that the drafters of the
NATO SOFA anticipated that the United States would exert exclusive jurisdiction
over troops stationed in foreign states).
185. Compare Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3(a)(ii), Agreed
Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a), Agreed Understanding art. XXII. para. 3(a) (defining
the terms of official duty), with NATO SOFA, supra note 11 (providing the
definition of the official duty).
186. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 625 (noting the NATO SOFA does
not contain a firm definition of an offense committed in the scope of official duty).
187. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(asserting that only those acts that are a necessary function of one's duty are
included in the definition of official duty).
188. See id. art. XXII, para. 3(a)(ii), Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(declaring that acts which are a substantial departure from the function of one's
duty are not included in the definition of official duty).
189. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 624 (asserting that the U.S.
interpretation of official duty includes nearly every offense committed in respect to
the U.S. military's commitments).
190. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(noting that acts that constitute a substantial departure from one's duty do not fall
under the definition of official conduct).
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is not provided whether simple, non-substantial departure falls
outside of the official duty. According to this interpretation,
Provision C is another confirmation of Provision A/B. In this respect,
the provision on "substantial departure" may be redundant. It seems
that one should not read too much into the concept of substantial
departure.
In conclusion, it is most probable that none of the provisions in the
Korea SOFA was intended to adopt specific definitions of official
duty. Korean critics say that there is no clear provision on the scope
and meaning of official duty. I9 ' Still, the Korea SOFA has what other
SOFAs do not, and it is not without merit to assess the provisions,
especially of "substantial departure," in light of certain cases.192
9 3 during a rest period, the superiors of an
In Wilson v. Girard,'
American soldier ordered him to guard a machine gun and clothing,
resulting the soldier's killing of a Japanese woman who was
gathering expended machine gun cartridges in Japan.' 94 The Japanese
government claimed to have primary jurisdiction because the killing
was not "duty or service required or authorized to be done by statute,
regulation, the order of a superior or military usage."' 95 The killing
itself was not an official duty, but it arose out of the act of guarding
the military equipment and therefore, it was understood that the
primary jurisdiction remained with the United States.'96
However, there was some testimony that the accused soldier was
enticing the victim and others onto the firing range and then
191.

Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 48 (arguing that the term "official duty"

lacks clear definition); JANG-HIE LEE ET AL., supra note 9, at 108-09 (arguing that
a more specific definition is needed to avoid possible disputes as to the
interpretation of the Korea SOFA).
192. Compare Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII, para. 3(a)(ii), Agreed
Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a), Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(providing a definition of the term "official duty"), with NATO SOFA, supra note
11 (defining "official duty").
193. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).

194. See id. at 526 (explaining that a U.S. military member killed a Japanese
woman gathering spent shell casings).
195. See SNEE & PYE, supra note 151, at 50 (noting that the Japanese
government believed it had primary jurisdiction over the case).
196. See id. (stating that the United States, however, waived its primary
jurisdiction at the request of Japan); Norman, supra note 44, at 735.
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frightening them with his gun. 197 If this testimony is true, the killing
'
did not arise out of official duty, but out of his own "horseplay." 98
This conclusion would be equally possible without the concept of
substantial departure. Nevertheless, it might be argued that the
killing resulted from the official duty of guarding the machine gun
because the horseplay was incidental to the whole exercise. Such an
argument could be efficiently rebutted with the help of the concept of
substantial departure.199 In this context, it is possible to say that,
under certain circumstances, the concept may play a useful
supplementary role in facilitating the restriction of the scope of
official duty. 00
On February 3, 1998, a U.S Marine aircraft EA-6B Prowler
engaged in a low-level training flight in the Italian Alps severed a
cable-car line at a ski resort in Cavalese, killing twenty passengers.20 1
An Italian public prosecutor indicted the crew and other officers of
U.S Marine Corps., but the Court of Trento dismissed the case on the
ground that this matter fell within the primary jurisdiction of the
United States under the SOFA. 20° A U.S. military court tried the pilot
and acquitted him of manslaughter but found him guilty of
obstruction of justice. 20 3 His acquittal on the twenty counts of
manslaughter shocked public opinion in many European states and

197. See SNEE & PYE supra note 151, at 50 (claiming that there was conflicting
testimony regarding the actions of the accused soldier).
198. See id. (arguing that if the death of the Japanese woman was the result of
the serviceman's "horseplay," this act does not fall under the serviceman's official
duty).
199. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(explaining the importance of "significant departure" from official duties).
200. See id. (noting that acts that are a significant departure from official duties
are not protected by the Korea SOFA).
201. See W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, The Incident at Cavalese
and Strategic Compensation, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 505, 506 (2000) (describing the

incident at Cavalese).
202. See id. (noting that the United States had primary jurisdiction over the
case).
203. See Sean D. Murphy, Compensationfor Collision with Italian Ski Gondola,

94 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 541 (2000) (noting the judgment of the military court).

2003]

KOREA- UNITED STA TES

SOFA

1139

particularly aroused the Italian public.20 4 In this case, if the crewmembers had been obviously flying lower or faster than instructed,
or if they had been flying off-course, heated debates would have
arisen on the scope of official duty and the primary right to
jurisdiction.205 Such reckless or deviant flying could not be regarded
as the performance of official duty if the "within the limits of official
duty" criterion were applied to the case.20 6 If the broader concept of
official duty the United States favors were to prevail, the official
duty provision could cover such flying, since the offense of killing
twenty people was committed in the performance of the official
military training, no matter how reckless the pilot was flying.20 7 In
this context, the concept of substantial departure would not be of
significant help.20 8 It is difficult to determine whether violations of
instructions on speed, altitude, or flying course would constitute
'substantial' departure from the acts required in a duty.
Unlike "horseplay" that could be an issue in Wilson v. Girard,
gross violations of speed or altitude limits are still closely related to
the performances of official flight exercises. 20 9 After all,
"substantial" departure is likely to beg questions and cannot be a
conclusive answer.

204. See Reisman & Sloane, supra note 201, at 508. The developments in the
aftermath of the Cavalese incident were similar to the armored vehicle accident
that happened in Korea in June, 2002. Both accidents took place in the
performance of official duties, and the accused members of the U.S forces were all
acquitted of the negligent homicide and involuntary manslaughter by the U.S court
martial in both cases. Also, such acquittals enraged the public in both of the
receiving countries. Id.
205. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 606 (noting that the Italian
prosecutor argued that the flight was not part of the official duty of the U.S.
military because the pilot violated the mandated flight pattern).
206. See id. at 624 (arguing that reckless flying would be outside the scope of
official duty).
207. Id. (stating the United States' argument that any action undertaken in
regard to its military duty falls within the scope of official duty).
208. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(explaining the role of "substantial departure").
209. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 624 (arguing that according to the
Italian interpretation of official duty, the U.S. crew-members would be acting
outside of their official duty if they were flying lower or faster than instructed, or
flying off course).
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Certain class of acts can safely remain within the "substantial
departure from the acts required to perform in a particular duty." For
example, unreasonable or irregular acts in pursuit of personal
pleasure (such as "horseplay") are without doubt outside of the
official duty. 21° Also, crimes against humanity including torture are
substantial departure from any official duties. 21' The decisions of the
Law Lords of Britain on Pinochet, the ex-president of Chile, show
that torture and other serious violations of human rights cannot
constitute acts arising out of official duties.212
Whatever the contents of the substantial departure may be, the
provision is nothing but the reconfirmation of the stipulation that not
all acts done during the performance of official duty are regarded as
official duty.2" 3 The Korea SOFA is not very different from the
NATO SOFA in that the scope of official duty is not clearly
defined. 214 This leads to the question of who determines the scope of

official duty.
2. Who Determines It?
At the drafting convention of the NATO SOFA, the United States
argued that the authorities of the sending states were alone capable of
deciding whether the members of their forces were on official duty
and whether the offenses in question were committed in the

210. See

SNEE

& PYE, supra note 151.

211. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/9 (2002) (stating that according to the definition in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, crimes against humanity are acts committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian populations including
murder, torture and rape).
212. See Ruth Wedgwood, InternationalCriminal Law and Augusto Pinochet,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829, 840-41 (2000) (claiming that acts such as torture and
serious violations of human rights can never fall under official duties).
213. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(noting that at a minimum "substantial departure" means that not all acts are
included within the scope of official duty).
214. Compare id. art. XXII, para. 3(a)(ii), Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a),
Agreed Understanding art. XXII, para. 3(a) (defining the terms of official duty),
with NATO SOFA, supra note 11 (providing the definition of the official duty).
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performance of such official duties. 2 5 The NATO SOFA is silent on

this issue, and usually the sending state's issuance of an "official
duty certificate" solves the problem. 216 The Korea SOFA adopts a
similar approach."' The issuance of a certificate by competent U.S.
military authorities is regarded as sufficient evidence of the fact of
official duty for the purpose of determining primary jurisdiction.1 8 In
certain exceptional cases where there is proof contrary to the
certificate of official duty, it is made the subject of review through
discussions between Korean officials and the U.S diplomatic mission
in Korea.2" 9 In general, Korea seems to have accepted the certificate
as conclusive of the matter.220 Indeed, many receiving states accept
the determination of the United States military authorities and accept
an official duty certificate without question. 22 1 It is sometimes
suggested that the determination of official duty should be left in the
hands of an objective third party, 222 but such an arbitrational process
223
could impede the speedy trial required in a criminal proceeding.
215. See SNEE & PYE, supra note 151, at 51 (noting the U.S. proposal for the
definition of official duty).
216. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 625 (stating that the United States
normally issues a official duty certificate to armed forces overseas and these
certificates are accepted by the host country as proof of the service members'
official duty).
217. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(stating that a certificate from the U.S. certifying that an action arose out of official
duty will be sufficient evidence that the act was undertaken as a function of official
duty).
218. See id. (noting that a certificate of official duty is sufficient for determining
primary jurisdiction).
219. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a)(2)
(claiming that if the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic of Korea does not believe
that the act arose out of official duty the disagreement shall be settled through
discussions between the Korean government and the U.S. mission in Korea).
220. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 48.
221. See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 83, at 626 (noting that a large number of
states unquestionably accept official duty certificates).
222. See Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 9, at 48-49; SNEE & PYE, supra note 151, at
51.
223. See SNEE & PYE, supra note 151, at 51 (arguing that arbitrational processes
may slow down the speed of the trial); Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXIII, para.
2(b), 8 (stating that in case of civil claims, however, the dispute as to whether a
tortuous act or omission of a member of U.S forces was done in the performance of
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If there was not a provision on the certificate in SOFAs, the
receiving state's court would determine the nature of cases
concerned, and the certificate the U.S. military authorities issued
would merely be a part of the whole evidence.224 This may support
the argument that the Korea SOFA is unequal to other SOFAs, but
actually Korea is not the only state who accepts the determination of
the sending state's official duty certificate. 5 On the whole, the
criteria of inequality give a mixed assessment in this respect.
The determination of official duty is not for immunity or
clemency, but for establishment of proper jurisdiction.226 From the
"losing" state's point of view, however, the determination that the
offense was committed in the course of official duty practically
stands for immunity from its jurisdiction. 22 7 The United States should
take into consideration the sensitivity and gravity of the issue
whenever it issues an official duty certificate.

CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War in Europe has eroded public perception
that the presence of foreign military forces serves national security.228
In the case of South Korea, where the Cold War is not completely
over, however, the presence of U.S. forces is seen as essential for its

official duty can be submitted to an arbitrator selected by agreement between two
governments from among the nationals of Korea who hold or have held high
judicial office). This arbitration process is not applied with regard to criminal
cases. Id.
224. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, Agreed Minutes art. XXII, para. 3(a)
(providing that a certificate of official duty suffices for the purpose of establishing
primary jurisdiction with the United States).
225. See Young-won Kim, supra note 43, at 119.
226. See Korea SOFA, supra note 3, art. XXII (explaining the terms of
jurisdiction in respect to criminal acts committed by U.S. service members).
227. Cf Reisman & Sloan, supra note 201, at 513-14 (noting the Italian
dissatisfaction with the implementation of the NATO SOFA in the Cavalese case).
Many Italians believe that the minimal sentence imposed on the service members
indicate the United States' unwillingness to prosecute its service members. Id.
228. See id. at 505 (noting that public perception regarding the necessity of
NATO forces for national security has changed since the end of the Cold War).
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security. 229 The Korea SOFA is of great importance in maintaining
such a close military alliance between the two nations. It is often
criticized as an unfair or unequal agreement. Nevertheless, the
foregoing analysis of various provisions on the criminal matter of the
Korea SOFA and related practices reveals that it is not completely
unequal or unfair in comparison with general international law and
other SOFAs. After two rounds of revision, the Korea SOFA has
accomplished overall similarity to the NATO SOFA and the Japan
SOFA. 230 This similarity seems to lessen the extent to which critics
can argue "inequality."
The outcome of the analysis indicates that the real problems lie in
the application of the SOFA, rather than in the provisions
themselves. The inequality criticism is more appropriately applied in
relation to provisions such as the asymmetric appeal rights and the
practice of waiver and punishment than any other issues. The
asymmetry of appeal rights has not yet caused many actual problems
and controversies, but the high rate of waiver of jurisdiction does
present problems. Also, the wide perception that the U.S soldiers are
not properly punished for their crimes provides the basis of attacks
on the Korea SOFA and the military ties between the two
countries. 23' The U.S. authorities exclusive determination of the
official duty could also offend sovereign sentiment of Koreans, even
though such exclusivity is widely accepted in many parts of the
world where the United States has stationed forces.
Such problems cannot be properly addressed by "revising the
SOFA." It should be asked if such demands for the revision of the
SOFA are overly influenced by a strict legal positivism. A more
realistic approach would focus on the actual application of the
SOFA. For example, it is possible for South Korea to reduce the rate
of waiver of its primary jurisdiction to a reasonable extent, and the
229. See Stephen W. Bosworth, U.S.-Korean Relations After the Summit, 25WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 25, 26-27 (2001) (noting that South Korea still
faces a military threat from North Korea).
230. Compare Korea SOFA, supra note 3 (stating the terms of the Korea
SOFA), with NATO SOFA, supra note 11 (describing the terms of the treaty); and
Japan SOFA, supra note 11 (recounting the terms of the treaty).
231. See Kirk & Francis, supra note 9, at 256 (noting that U.S. military courts
often give light sentences to U.S. service members guilty of committing crimes in
foreign jurisdictions).
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U.S. government could adjust the policy of requesting waiver for
better relations with its allies. It is also possible to take measures to
apply appropriate punishment to criminals convicted either by South
Korea or by the United States. In order to improve the situations
concerning the Korea SOFA, efforts should be made towards
resolving such real issues.
Moreover, legal positivism may conceal important political and
historical aspects of the Korea SOFA. Essentially, the SOFA exists
to accord favors to the U.S. armed forces, probably in return for the
obvious benefits resulting from their presence in the receiving
country. In a sense, some elements of "inequality" pertain to the
nature of the SOFA. Consequently, scrapping all the "unequal"
statutory elements of SOFA amounts to repudiating the very
existence of the SOFA. A certain degree of statutory "inequality"
could well serve political needs for support from the sending
country. In this respect, the balance should be struck between the
very needs of the sending party and the fairer application of the
SOFA.

